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1. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of collusion has been an austere threat to organizations since
the origin of human society. Fighting collusion thus has been a permanent challenge
to the politicians and scholars in political science and sociology. However, collusive
phenomena have been by and large ignored by economists, with a few exceptions
of Chichago School’s approach to regulatory capture in 1970s. Since 1980s, there
has been a growing interest in studying collusive behavior, in various environments
such as industrial organization, regulation and political economy.
Recent academic research on the theory of Collusion-Proof Mechanism Design
has made much progress since the seminal paper Tirole (1986). The basic frame-
work in the environment of multi-agent is developed by Laﬀont and Martimort
(1997, 2000) under adverse selection setting and Itoh (1993) under moral hazard
setting based on contract theory, which allows to integrate collusion as part of the
general mechanism design under a hierarchy of organizations. As a shortcut of the
methodology, it is assumed that a coalition is formed through a side contract, which
is designed and enforced by a benevolent third party called side mediator.
The so-called "full-side-contracting" assumption plays a key role in collusion-
proof mechanism design. It provides a simple and neat approach of modeling coali-
tion formation and thus eliminates the problem of finding an extensive form for
describing the collusive game between agents. The third party paradigm can be
seen as a black box for the repeated interaction by which collusion emerges, which
characterizes the upper bound that can be achieved by the coalition.
1We are grateful to Hideshi Itoh, David Martimort, Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole for their
comments, as well as participants of my presentation in EEA conference 2006. Finacial support
from China Scholarship Council is acknowledged.
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The main problem of Laﬀont-Martimort-Itoh framework is that, in most cases,
the optimal outcomes in the absence of collusion cannot be implemented in the
presence of collusion. As shown in Laﬀont-Martimort (2000) under adverse selec-
tion setting, if the agents’ types are correlated, preventing collusion entails addi-
tional incentive cost which brings further distortion of eﬃciency due to the trade-oﬀ
between rent-extraction and eﬃciency. While under moral hazard with mutually
observable actions, Itoh (1993) shows that there exists no collusion-proof grand
mechanism which can implement the first-best allocations under collusion, whereas
the first-best can be uniquely implemented in the absence of collusion as shown in
Ma (1988).
The reason why preventing collusion is costly in Laﬀont-Martimort-Itoh frame-
work is that the relative situation between the principal and collusive agents is not
characterized adequately. In this framework, except for the full-side-contracting
assumption, there are two restrictions in this framework: first, the communication
between the principal and agents is public; second, all transfers in the grand con-
tract are also public, in other words, the grand contract is enforced publicly. The
side contract is enforced privately which makes the coalition a black box for the
principal, whereas the grand contract is enforced publicly which makes the grand
mechanism a transparent box to the coalition, that is, the relative situation be-
tween the principal and collusive agents is asymmetric. Under this framework, the
coalition can be regarded as an integrated entity embedded into the grand mech-
anism, which implies that collusion is perfect and the highest collusive allocation
can be achieved. Hence, the Laﬀont-Martimort-Itoh framework establishes a bench-
mark of the theory which characterizes the lowest bound that can be attained by a
collusion-proof grand mechanism.
We argue that a coalition is not an integrated entity since there exists incongru-
ence of interests among coalition members. Introducing a side mediator allows the
coalition to settle down the conflict through side contracting, however, the upper
bound that can be achieved by the coalition is determined by the grand mechanism
because the side contract is embedded as a subgame into the grand mechanism. Un-
der the publicly enforced grand contract, collusion is perfect and the highest bound
can be achieved, whereas it can be made imperfect under privately enforcement.
When the bilateral communication and transfer between the principal and each
agent are enforced in a private way which are neither observable nor verifiable by
other players, coalition formation turns to be a game with incomplete information
which entails transaction costs. Collusion thus becomes imperfect and the highest
collusive allocation might be unattainable. This highlights the principle of "divide
and conquer" in fighting collusion.
This paper is motivated to find out an optimal collusion-proof mechanism which
can implement the optimal no-collusion outcomes in the presence of collusion, by
appealing to the approach of private enforcement of the grand contract. The basic
idea of this approach is quite intuitive. When forming a coalition, agents must share
common information about collective actions through communication. Collusion
can be prevented by the principal if he can extract the collusive information from
the coalition members. However, revealing collusive information through any public
reporting is infeasible when the coalition is enforced by a side mediator, which
implies that the only eﬀective way of extracting collusive information is to induce
secret report by the agents.
To breed secret reporting in the grand mechanism, the following necessary con-
ditions must be met: first, there must be some channels for secret reporting; second,
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when an informant cannot bring hard evidence, an incentive compatible reward-
ing scheme must be designed to warrant his truth-telling; third, the identity of a
whistle-blower must be hidden information, which implies that the rewards and
fines for the whistle-blower must be enforced privately.
In a setting of moral hazard with mutually observable actions, we apply the
approach of private enforcement to collusion-proof mechanism design. We pro-
pose a multi-stage indirect mechanism integrated with secret reporting and private
transferring to extract collusive information. Under this mechanism, each agent
is required to submit a secret report to the principal after a given eﬀort pair has
been taken. Each agent is allowed to win a bonus lottery if he reports the collusive
actions, and his losing peer is levied a heavy fine. When both agents report the
collusive actions, they must compete for the bonus which gives each agent only half
chance of wining. Moreover, the bonus and fines are enforced through a private
way which are neither observable nor verifiable by the side mediator. Since the
identity of a whistle-blower is hidden information under private enforcement, each
agent has incentives to defect and win the bonus under this mechanism. The col-
lusive game thus turns to be a classical Prisoner’s Dilemma in which defecting is a
dominant strategy for both agents, hence the collusive outcome cannot be enforced
in equilibrium. As a result, the first-best outcome can be implemented in spite of
collusion.
The main contribution of this paper is of two aspects: first, in the setting of
moral hazard with mutually observable actions, by incorporating the approach of
private enforcement into a multi-stage indirect mechanism, it shows that the first-
best outcome can be implemented in spite of collusion, which is in contrast with
the impossibility result in Itoh (1993).
Second, this paper brings a new point of view into the theory of collusion-proof
mechanism design, which highlights the principle of divide and conquer in fighting
collusion. This principle is introduced into the theory of anti-collusion by Chen
(2006a) at the first time. Under a simple model of tournament where the eﬃcient
eﬀort levels are impossible to be implemented through simple mechanisms due to
perfect collusion, Chen (2006a) shows that, by manipulating information under a
sophisticated and indirect mechanism with a biased promotion rule, the principal
can create asymmetric information among agents. This brings a trade-oﬀ between
rent-extraction and eﬃciency into the coalition which reduces the eﬃciency of the
coalition and shrinks the stakes of collusion. As a result, the eﬃcient eﬀort levels
are possible to be implemented under the sophisticated mechanism. Moreover,
Chen (2006a) shows that the indirect mechanism can perform better than direct
mechanism in fighting collusion, which implies that restricting attention only to
direct revelation mechanisms would be never optimal in collusion-proof mechanism
design, a result also demonstrated in this paper.
There are other new approaches motivated to resolve the main problem in the
Laﬀont-Martimort-Itoh framework. In a recent paper by Che and Kim (2005), it is
shown that collusion can be prevented at no cost in a large class of circumstances
under adverse selection settings with risk-neutral agents, including both uncorre-
lated types and correlated types. In that paper, the authors develop a general
method for collusion-proof mechanism design, which utilizes the idea of "selling the
firm to the agents". However, when there are only two agents with correlated types,
preventing collusion entails strictly costs under their mechanism. Moreover, their
approach is not robust with risk-averse agents. Their approach is quite diﬀerent
from our paper, and cannot be generalized to the case of moral hazard.
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The approach of private enforcement are widely employed in fighting collusion.
About 300 years ago, the Emperor Yongzheng in China Tsing Dynasty created a
monitoring system to fight collusion and corruption. The most famous instrument
was the so-called "sealed-box", which was granted by the Emperor to his favored
ministers for conveying their secret reports. A sealed box had two keys: one for
the reporter and another for the Emperor, and it can be delivered directly to the
Emperor through a special and secret channel, whereas the regular reports can
be sent only through bureaucratic channels. In a secret report, if the reporter
can provide significant evidence on other’s criminal activities, such as collusion
and corruption, he can win the Emperor’s trust as a reward; otherwise he can be
punished for false reporting. Since enforcing of this system, it was recorded that, in
10 years, thousands of bureaucrats involved in criminal activities had been thrown
into jails or executed, resulting a significant reduction of collusion and corruption
at that time.
Nowadays, the policy of secret reporting is extensively used to fight organized
crimes with a great success. Most notably, the practice of this policy in the case of
Italy against Sicilian Mafia as well as US against drug-dealing and related crimes
brings a wide debate on the role of snitch which causes a fundamental shift in the
country’s anti-drug laws — including federal mandatory minimum sentencing and
conspiracy provisions2.
To economists, perhaps, the most famous case of secret reporting is the Le-
niency Program in antitrust law enforcement. In 1993, US Antitrust Division of
Department of Justice has redesigned its Corporate Leniency Policy which estab-
lishes that criminal sanctions can be avoided if a colluding firm reveals information
either before an investigation is opened or the Division has not yet been able to
prove collusion3. The Leniency Program that breeds whistle-blowing is widely re-
garded as a tremendous success. Since its introduction, an unprecedented number
of cartels has been detected and successfully prosecuted, enormous fines (up to US$
500 millions) has been levied against participants, and several top executives have
served jail sentences in the US4.
The rest is organized as follows. In section 2, the basic model is presented. We
then turn to the first-best implementation in the absence of collusion in section 3
as a benchmark. In section 4, we review the methodology the theory and then turn
to our main theme in section 5, which shows that first-best can be implemented in
spite of collusion by appealing to the approach of private enforcement. In section 6,
we extend this approach to the environment of unverifiable outputs, and show that
nonverifiability of outputs has no bites to collusion-proofness. We finally summarize
in section 7.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a three-person game with one principal and two agents. A risk-
neutral principal has two tasks delegated to two identical and risk-averse agents, A1
and A2 , whose eﬀort levels are mutually observable but cannot be observed by the
principal. Each agent n, n = 1, 2 can choose an eﬀort level en ∈ E = {0, 1, ...,N}
at a cost C(en), which is strictly increasing and convex and satisfies C(0) = 0.
2A useful introduction is at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/snitch/
3The European Union introduces a similar leniency program in 1996.
4 See Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2003), Aubert, Rey and Kovacic (2005) and Chen and
Rey (2006) for detailed analysis.
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For a given eﬀort pair e = (e1, e2), each production process generates randomly
one of finitely possible outputs qn ∈ {q1, ..., qI}, n = 1, 2 with q1 < q2 < ... < qI .
For i, j ∈ {1, ..., I}, let qij = (qi, qj) denote a pair of joint output, where the first
variable stands for A1’s output and the second variable for A2’s output. Let πij(e)
denote the joint probability distribution of the output pair qij given an eﬀort pair
e. Assume that diﬀerent eﬀort pairs are distinguishable statistically, that is, the
following condition holds:
Condition (C.1) (pair-wise identifiability of eﬀorts).
Π(el) 6= Π(ek),∀el 6= ek, where Π(el) = (πij(el))i,j .
An allocation x = (t, e) is a set of payments and eﬀorts, where t = (t1(qij), t2(qij))
is a vector of output-contingent transfers from the principal to the agents, and
e = (e1, e2) is a pair of eﬀort levels.
For an allocation x = (t, e), the principal’s utility can be expressed as:
U(e) =
P
i,j πij(e)[S(qij)− t1(qij)− t2(qij)],
and agent An’s utility can be expressed by:
Vn(e) =
P
i,j πij(e)V (t
n(qij))− C(en),
where S(.) is the principal’s revenue of the outputs and V (.) is agents’ von-
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, which is continuous, strictly increasing and
concave. For outputs qij = (q1i , q
2
j ), denoting by v
n
ij = V (t
n(qij)) agent n’s von-
Neumann-Morgenstern utility level, we can replace the principal’s control variables
with tn(qij) = h(vnij), where h = V
−1.
Following Grossman and Hart (1983) and Mookherjee (1984), the principal’s
optimization program can be decomposed into two stages: At the first stage, given
any eﬀort pair, find the incentive scheme that minimizes expected incentive costs
subject to agents’ incentive compatibility and participation constraints. At the
second stage, the principal chooses an optimal eﬀort pair which maximizes his
expected utility. In this paper, to fix idea, we focus only on the principal’s program
at the first stage, that is, the implementation problem.
3. BENCHMARK: FIRST-BEST ALLOCATION WITHOUT COLLUSION
When eﬀort levels are mutually observable by each other, the first-best incentive
contract can be implemented uniquely through a Moore-Repullo Mechanism in the
absence of collusion, as shown in Ma (1988). Suppose that the principal wants
to implement eﬀort pair e∗ = (e∗1, e∗2). Since agents are risk-averse, optimal risk
sharing rules then implies that agents’ payments must be independent of the random
outputs under perfect monitoring. Therefore, the first-best utility-payments are
C(e∗1) and C(e
∗
2) respectively, that is v
n
ij = C(e
∗
n), for all i, j, n = 1, 2. To fix
idea, we develop a multi-stage mechanism to implement the first-best, with slight
diﬀerence from Ma’s mechanism. The timing of the game is illustrated as follows:
[Timing of the game]
Stage 0: The principal proposes a grand mechanism G0, which is approved if
no agent vetoes.
Stage 1: Both agents take eﬀorts simultaneously which are mutually observed.
Stage 2: Each agent submits a public report of eﬀort pair be1and be2 respectively.
If be1 = be2 = e∗, then the first-best allocation is enforced and each agent gets utility
payment C(e∗1) and C(e
∗
2) respectively; otherwise, a win-loss game is triggered
which entitles the winner a bonus lottery and levies the loser a fine in addition to
the first-best payments:
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Case (1): If be1 = e∗ and be2 6= e∗, then agent A2 wins a bonus lottery X(be2) =
(xij(be2))ij , which entitles him an output-contingent reward scheme xij(be2) based
on his report, whereas agent A1 is levied a fine R as the loser, and vice versa.
Case (2): If be1 6= e∗ and be2 6= e∗, then the winner and loser are determined by
tossing an unbiased coin.
Stage 3: Outputs realize; the contract is enforced.
In this mechanism, R > C(e∗1) + C(e
∗
2), and lotteries X(ben) satisfy, for eachben, n = 1, 2,
W (ben|e∗) =Pij xij(ben)πij(e∗) < 0,
and R > W (ben|ben) =Pij xij(ben)πij(ben) > 0. (1)
Note that, condition (C.1) implies the existence of lotteries X(ben) satisfying (1).
Under Condition (1), each agent has incentives to win the bonus lottery by
reporting the truth if any unwanted eﬀort pair has been taken, while no agent has
incentives to trigger the win-loss game when the proposed eﬀort pair has been taken.
Hence, with mutual monitoring, each agent will take the proposed eﬀort level and
report the truth under this mechanism. As a result, the first-best allocation can be
implemented through a unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, as expressed
by the following proposition
Proposition 1. (Ma (1988)): Assume condition (C.1) hold. If agents’ eﬀort
levels are mutually observable, then the eﬀort pair e∗ can be subgame-perfect imple-
mented through a multi-stage mechanism with first-best utility-payments to agents
C(e∗1) and C(e
∗
2).
Proof. We show that the proposed eﬀort pair e∗ can be enforced and the first-
best allocation can be implemented uniquely under this mechanism.
Consider the following strategy for each agent: agent An takes eﬀort e∗n at Stage
1 and reports ben = e∗ at Stage 2. Given that eﬀort pair e∗ has been taken by agents
at Stage 1, then no agent has incentives to report other eﬀort pair and trigger the
win-loss game at Stage 2, since by (1) no agent can benefit from winning the lottery
in this case. Therefore, reporting truth is optimal for both agents at Stage 2.
Now back to Stage 1, if agent A1 takes e1 instead of e∗1, then agent A2 has
incentives to report be2 = (e1, e∗2) and wins the lottery, which makes agent A1
strictly worse oﬀ. Hence, no one has incentives to deviate from σ∗ unilaterally,
which implies that σ∗ constitutes a SPNE.
On the other hand, given that any other eﬀort pair ed 6= e∗ has been taken,
then each agent has incentives to report ben = ed and win the bonus lottery. The
competitive reporting in the win-loss game makes each agent strictly worse oﬀ.
Hence, eﬀort pair ed cannot be implemented in equilibrium.
4. COLLUSION-PROOF MECHANISM DESIGN: ANOTHER POINT OF
VIEW
4.1. Coalition Formation
Unfortunately, the grand mechanism G0 is not robust to collusion. Since the
payment schemes are output-independent, agents can benefit from reducing the
eﬀort levels and then cheating the principal collectively. To characterize collusive
behavior, we assume that a coalition is formed followed by the grand contract and
is enforced by a side contract:
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Assumption 1. (full side contracting) A coalition formed by the agents is sus-
tained through a side contract which is designed and enforced by a benevolent side
mediator.
Assumption 1 provides a shortcut in methodology which allows us to deal with
coalition formation under a neat and simple framework built on contract theory.
Given the grand mechanism, under this assumption, we can characterize the prob-
lem of coalition formation by an optimization program of the side mediator, which
maximizes the total welfare of the coalition subject to coalition incentive compat-
ibility constraints and coalition participation constraints. According to Myerson
(1982), Assumption 1 then ensures that the Revelation Principle holds in side con-
tracting: without loss of generality, the side mediator can restrict his attention only
to incentive compatible direct mechanisms.
Under mechanism G0, the side mediator can choose an eﬀort pair to maximize
joint welfare of the coalition rather than the welfare of the principal, and this can
be achieved by sending a pair of false messages to the principal. Suppose that a
benevolent side mediator proposes a side contract to the agents as follows: Both
agents take eﬀorts eˆ = (0, 0) and then report e∗. The stakes of collusion under
this side contract are C(e∗1) + C(e
∗
2), which can be reallocated inside the coalition
without any transaction costs. It is obvious that this side contract can be enforced
under grand mechanism G0, which results in an ineﬃcient eﬀort pair eˆ = (0, 0).
Hence, under full-side-contracting, the first-best outcome cannot be implemented,
as shown by Itoh (1993).
Proposition 2. (Itoh (1993)) There exists no Collusion-Proof mechanism which
implements the first-best allocation.
Proof. See Itoh (1993).
4.2. A Review of Methodology
The impossibility result of Proposition 2 appeals to rethink the methodology of
the theory of collusion-proof mechanism design. Under the framework of Laﬀont-
Martimort-Itoh, except for the basic assumption of full-side-contracting, there are
two restrictions on methodology: first, all communication between the principal
and agents is public; second, all transfers in the grand contract are also public, in
other words, the grand contract is enforced publicly.
The main diﬃculty the theory of collusion-proof mechanism design confronted
is that the Revelation Principle fails under collusion. A coalition has incentives to
manipulate information revelation according to its own interests, which flunks the
incentive compatibility of the grand contract. To prevent collusion, the principal
must revise the original grand contract to make it incentive compatible for collec-
tively truth-telling by the coalition. This sheds light on a so-called Principle of
Collusion-Proofness: for any initial contract which is not collusion-proof, without
loss of generality, the principal can restrict his attention to optimal collusion-proof
grand contract which replicates the outcome of the coalition and thus no collusion
arises in equilibrium. The Principle of Collusion-Proofness is indeed a version of
Revelation Principle in the presence of collusion.
Under public enforcement of the grand contract, the communication between the
principal and agents and reallocation of collusive stakes between agents can be fully
controlled and manipulated by the side mediator. Hence, the strategic interaction
between the principal and the coalition can be regarded as a game played by the
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principal and the side mediator. Appealing to the Principle of Collusion-Proofness,
the principal can, without loss of generality, design an incentive compatible mech-
anism for collectively truth-telling, which leaves suﬃcient rents to the coalition.
Therefore, by integrating collusion as a subgame into the grand mechanism and
then modeling the grand mechanism as a game played by the principal and coali-
tion, the Revelation Principle is reestablished. Hence, without loss of generality,
the principal can restrict his attention only to direct revelation mechanism which
is optimal and collusion-proof.
Under this framework, the trade-oﬀ between extraction of collusive rents and
eﬃciency leads to further distortion of eﬃciency in the grand mechanism, which
implies that the optimal outcomes in the absence of collusion might be infeasible
under collusion. As shown in Laﬀont and Martimort (2000) under adverse selection
setting, if the agents’ types are correlated, the first-best outcomes implemented
by Cremer-McLean Mechanism cannot be achieved under collusion and thus the
collusion-proof grand mechanism entails additional incentive costs to the principal.
Under the environment of moral hazard with mutually observable actions, Itoh
(1993) shows that it is impossible to implement first-best allocation in the presence
of collusion. Moreover, he shows that the principal can implement any eﬀort pair
with less costs under agents mutual monitoring and side contracting than no side
contract, which implies that the Collusion-Proof Principle does not work under this
environment.
The reason why preventing collusion is costly in Laﬀont-Martimort-Itoh frame-
work is that the relative situation between the principal and collusive agents is not
characterized adequately. When restricting to public enforcement, the principal is
assigned the weakest power in grand contracting with agents and thus the relative
situation between the principal and the coalition is asymmetric. The side contract is
enforced privately which makes the coalition a black box for the principal; whereas
the grand contract is enforced publicly which makes the grand mechanism a trans-
parent box to the coalition. Due to this asymmetric relative situation, the coalition
can be regarded as an integrated entity embedded into the grand mechanism, which
implies that collusion is perfect and the highest collusive allocation can be achieved.
If we regard the no-collusion environment as the upper benchmark of the theory in
which the highest bound of allocation can be achieved by a grand mechanism, then
the framework of Laﬀont-Martimort-Itoh provides a lower benchmark of the theory
under perfect collusion, which characterizes the lowest bound that can be attained
by a collusion-proof grand mechanism. Under the environment where the lowest
bound does not coincide with the highest bound, preventing collusion entails strict
costs and thus the optimal no-collusion outcomes are infeasible in the presence of
collusion.
Hence, it would be not optimal to restrict attention only to publicly enforced
grand contracts in fighting collusion. We argue that a coalition is not an inte-
grated entity since there exists incongruence of interests among coalition members.
Introducing a side mediator as a shortcut in methodology allows the coalition to
settle down the conflict through side contracting, however, the upper bound that
can be achieved by the coalition is determined by the grand mechanism because
the side contract is embedded as a subgame into the grand mechanism. Under the
publicly enforced grand contract, collusion is perfect and the highest bound can be
achieved, whereas it can be made imperfect under privately enforcement of grand
mechanism. When the bilateral communication and transfer between the princi-
pal and each agent are enforced in a private way which are neither observable nor
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verifiable by other players, coalition formation turns to be a game with incomplete
information which entails transaction costs. Collusion thus becomes imperfect and
the highest collusive allocation might be unattainable. This highlights the principle
of "divide and conquer" in fighting collusion.
This paper is motivated to find out an optimal collusion-proof mechanism that
can prevent collusion at no cost by appealing to the approach of private enforcement
of the grand contract. We focus on the setting of moral hazard with mutually
observable actions to fix ideas, since we are not ambitious to build a generalized
framework for optimal collusion-proof mechanism design.
The basic idea behind the approach of private enforcement is quite intuitive.
Agents must communicate to exchange information in order to coordinate their
collusive actions when they form a coalition. On the other hand, the common in-
formation shared in the coalition can undermine the coalition if it is extracted by
the principal. However, revealing collusive information through any public report-
ing is infeasible when the coalition is enforced by a side mediator, which implies
that the only eﬀective way of extracting collusive information is to induce secret
report by the agents. To this end, the following necessary conditions must be met:
first, there must be some channels for secret reporting; second, when an informant
cannot bring hard evidence, an incentive compatible rewarding scheme must be de-
signed to warrant his truth-telling; third, the identity of a whistle-blower must be
hidden information, which implies that the reward and fine for the whistle-blower
must be enforced through a private way.
To put these ideas into work, we propose a multi-stage mechanism integrated
with secret reporting and private transferring to extract collusive information. Un-
der this mechanism, after taking the proposed actions, each agent is required to
submit a secret report of the eﬀort pair, which provides a channel for whistle-
blowing. If both agents report that the proposed eﬀort pair has been taken, then
the first-best payments are enforced. Otherwise, a win-loss game is triggered which
allows each agent to win a bonus lottery by reporting the collusive actions. If only
one agent reports the collusive eﬀort pair, he wins the lottery automatically which
increases his utility payment, whereas his losing peer is levied a heavy fine. If
both agent report the collusive actions, then they must share the chance of winning
and losing. Moreover, the bonus lotteries and fine are enforced privately which
are neither observable nor verifiable by the side mediator. Since the identity of
a whistle-blower is hidden information under private enforcement, each agent has
incentives to defect and win the bonus lottery. This turns the collusive game to
be a classical prisoner’s dilemma where defecting is a dominant strategy for both
agents, hence the collusive outcomes cannot be enforced in equilibrium. As a re-
sult, collusion can be deterred and the first-best can be implemented under this
mechanism.
5. FIRST-BEST IMPLEMENTATION UNDER COLLUSION
5.1. Timing and Mechanisms
Suppose the principal wants to induce eﬀort pair e∗ through a grand mechanism
G in the presence of collusion. The mechanism we propose here is a revised version
of mechanism G0 which allows us to incorporate secret reporting and private trans-
ferring of the lotteries and fine into the grand contract, with its timing illustrated
as follows:
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[Timing of the game]
Stage 0: The principal proposes a grand mechanism G, which is approved if no
agent vetoes.
Stage 0.5: The side mediator proposes a side mechanism S; it is ratified if no
agent vetoes.
Stage 1: Both agents take eﬀorts simultaneously which are observed by the
coalition.
Stage 2: Each agent submits a secret report of eﬀort pair be1and be2 respectively.
If be1 = be2 = e∗, then the first-best allocation is enforced and each agent gets utility
payment C(e∗1) and C(e
∗
2) respectively; otherwise, a win-loss game is triggered
which entitles the winner a bonus lottery and levies the loser a fine in addition to
the first-best payments:
Case (1): If be1 = e∗ and be2 6= e∗, then agent A2 wins a bonus lottery X(be2) =
(xij(be2))ij , which entitles him an output-contingent reward scheme xij(be2) based
on his report, whereas agent A1 is levied a fine R as the loser, and vice versa.
Case (2): If be1 6= e∗ and be2 6= e∗, then the winner and loser are determined by
tossing an unbiased coin.
Stage 3: Outputs realize; all contracts are enforced.
In this mechanism, the lotteries X(ben) and fine R are the same as in mechanism
G0 and satisfy condition (1).
Under this mechanism, allowing secret reporting at Stage 2 opens a back door
for whistle-blowing when collusion emerges. Moreover, to conceal the identity of
a whistle-blower, the communication and transfers in the win-loss game must be
enforced privately which are neither observable nor verifiable by the side mediator.5
Assumption 2 (Private Enforcement): The communication between the prin-
cipal and agents and the transfers of lotteries and fine are enforced privately.
Remark 1. Under this assumption, the total payments of the agents are de-
composed into two parts: the first-best payments which are public, and the bonus
and fine which are private6. One may argue that, under private enforcement, the
problem of commitment by the principal will arise since the lottery and fine are
transferred in a private way. In practice, this problem can be solved either by a
reputation mechanism or by arbitration. In this one-shot game, we assume that the
principal can employ an arbitrator to enforce the private transfers. If one insists
that private enforcement will entail additional cost to the principal, in this mecha-
nism, the expected arbitration cost is zero since the private transfers are enforced
only in the path out of equilibrium which occurs with probability zero.
When designing a side contract, under assumption 1, without loss of generality,
the side mediator can restrict his attention to direct side contracts. To fix ideas,
we assume that the side mediator can monitor the agents’ eﬀort levels7. However,
5 In the practice of law enforcement, all information about secret reporting, including the prize
are kept in secret in order to protect the whistle-blower.
6One may argue that, while the agent who has received a bonus can keep secret, the agent
who has received a fine won’t remain silent. We can image that the bonus and fine are trans-
fered through private accounts, which generates no hard evidence. If one agrees with the private
enforcement of the side contract, he should also agree with the private enforcement of the grand
contract.
7This assumption gives the side mediator more power in designing side contract, which im-
proves the eﬃciency of the coalition. Later we will show that our approach is robust to collusion
even under this assumption, hence this assumption has no bite to collusion-proofness under our
mechanism.
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the subgame at Stage 2 is a black box for the side mediator, which makes it im-
possible to design a side contract contingent on any information at Stage 2. Given
the grand mechanism G, let S = {φ(e), (s1ij(φ,m))ij , (s2ij(φ,m))ij} denote the side
mechanism, where
φ(e) = (φ1(e), φ2(e)) = ec is a collective manipulation of eﬀort pair;
m = (m1,m2) ∈ E2 is a pair of messages sent by the agents about their secret
reports;
snij(φ,m) is the output-contingent side payment that agent An receives, which
also depends on the collective manipulation and messages.
The side mediator is not a source of money and therefore the coalition’s budget
is balanced: h(s1ij(φ,m)) + h(s
2
ij(φ,m)) ≤ 0, for all i, j.
Under this side mechanism, agent An’s expected utility is revised to
V cn (ec) = C(e∗n) +
P
i,j πij(e
c)snij(φ,m))− C(ecn).
5.2. The Main Result
Under the grand mechanism G and side mechanism S, we show that only null
side contract that enforces the no-collusion outcome can arise in equilibrium, which
implies that the first-best allocation can be implemented in spite of collusion.
Proposition 3. Assume condition (C.1) hold. If agents’ eﬀort levels are mu-
tually observable, then the eﬀort pair e∗ can be enforced and first-best allocations
can be implemented through an optimal collusion-proof mechanism which has unique
SPNE.
Proof. Given the grand mechanism G, suppose the side mediator wants to
induce a collusive eﬀort pair ec 6= e∗ through a side contract S = {φ(e∗) =
ec, (s1ij(φ,m))ij , (s
2
ij(φ,m))ij}, supported by collusive strategy σc as follows:
"Agent An takes eﬀort ecn at Stage 1; then reports ben = e∗ to the principal and
sends message mn = e∗ to the side mediator at Stage 2. "
The proposition is shown through three steps.
Claim 1: Under this mechanism, the message pair m is not informative and
can be thus ignored.
Note that, to implement the collusive strategy, the side mediator must punish
the agent who reports ben 6= e∗ and triggers a win-loss game. This implies that
an agent who has reported ben = ec has no incentives to tell the truth. He can
always cheat the side mediator by sending a false message mn = e∗, since the final
outcomes of the subgame at Stage 3 are neither observable nor verifiable. Moreover,
sending a false message does not change the probability distribution of production
outputs, which implies that false reporting is not identifiable statistically in side
contracting. Hence no incentive compatible side mechanisms can extract the true
information on agents’ secret reports when deviation from collusive strategy occurs.
Claim 1 implies that side payments snij(φ,m) can be reduced to s
n
ij(φ) without
loss of generality.
Claim 2: σc cannot constitute a SPNE and thus side contract S cannot be
implemented in equilibrium.
Given that eﬀort pair ec has been taken at Stage 1, consider agent A1’s optimal
strategy at Stage 2. If he follows the collusive strategy, he can get
V c1 (σ
c) = C(e∗1) +
P
i,j πij(e
c)s1ij(φ) − C(ec1), given that his peer follows the
collusive strategy; and
V c1 (σc1, bσc2) = V c1 (σc)−R < 0, if his peer deviates by reporting be2 = ec.
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Suppose now agent A1 deviates by reporting be1 = ec. If agent A2 follows the
collusive strategy, then agent A1 wins the lottery X(ec) which updates his expected
utility payment
V c1 (bσc1, σc2) = C(e∗1)+Pi,j πij(ec)xij(ec)+Pi,j πij(ec)s1ij(φ)−C(ec1) = V c1 (σc)+
W (ec|ec) > V c1 (σc).
If, however, agent A2 also deviates from the collusive strategy, then agent A1
will win the lottery with probability 12 , which revises his utility payment to
V c1 (bσc1, bσc2) = C(e∗1) +Pi,j πij(ec)snij(φ)− C(ec1) + 12 [Pi,j πij(ec)xij(ec)−R]
= V c1 (σc) +
1
2 [W (e
c|ec)−R] > V c1 (σc1, bσc2).
Therefore, reporting ben = e∗ is dominated at Stage 2 and thus σc cannot be a
NE in the subgame.
Claim 3: only the null side contract S0 = {φ(e∗) = e∗, (s1ij(φ))ij = 0, (s2ij(φ))ij =
0} can be implemented through a unique SPNE.
Suppose the side mediator proposes the null side contract S0 supported by the
following strategy σ∗:
"Agent An takes eﬀort e∗n at Stage 1; then reports ben = e∗ at Stage 2."
Given eﬀort pair e∗ taken by the agents, suppose that one agent, say agent
A1 deviates from strategy σ∗ by reporting ben 6= e∗, then he triggers the win-loss
game. By condition (1), he cannot benefit from unilateral deviating even though
he wins the lottery. Therefore, reporting ben = e∗ is optimal for both agents at
Stage 2. At Stage 1, no agent is allowed to deviate from e∗ under the monitoring of
side mediator. Hence, no one has incentives to deviate from σ∗ unilaterally, which
implies that σ∗ constitutes a SPNE. The uniqueness of SPNE is obvious. Q.E.D
Under this grand mechanism, any side contract that proposes an collusive eﬀort
pair ec 6= e∗ cannot be sustained by any SPNE, because in the subgame of Stage 2,
each agent has incentives to report ec and trigger the win-loss game, which turns
this subgame to be a classical Prisoner’s Dilemma. Under assumption 2, for the
side mediator, the subgame at Stage 2 likes a black box where the reports and
outcomes are neither observable nor verifiable, hence it is impossible to design any
incentive compatible side contract to extract true information. As a result, only
the null side contract that induces the no-collusion eﬀort pair e∗ can be sustained
by a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, which implements the first-best outcome.
Proposition 3 is in contrast with Itoh (1993), who shows that there exists no
collusion-proof mechanism that implements the first-best incentive contract under
full side contracting. As we argued, while restricting to publicly enforced grand
contract, Itoh’s impossibility result establishes a lower benchmark for the theory.
Under private enforcement, the principal is assigned more power in grand con-
tracting to the agents, which allows him to bring incomplete information into the
coalition and undermine its eﬃciency. As a result, the first-best can be implemented
through an optimal collusion-proof grand mechanism.
6. EXTENSION: UNVERIFIABLE OUTPUTS
The mechanism we developed above can be also applied to the environment of
unverifiable outputs. Without loss of generality, we assume that agents’ relative
performance is verifiable8.
8For example, there exists a kind of well-established technology to measure and verify the
relative performance, which can be utlilized by a courte of law.
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Assume that there are three verifiable states of natures, namely, "{q1 > q2}",
"{q1 < q2}" and "{q1 = q2}", denoted by α, β and γ respectively. Let Q = {qij}
be the set of output pairs, then α = {qij |q1i > q2j}, β = {qij |q1i < q2j}, γ = {qij |q1i =
q2j }. Notice that, the set of states denoted by Ω = {α, β, γ} is a coarser partition
of output space Q.
For any eﬀort pair e = (e1, e2), the probability distributions P (e) = (pα(e), pβ(e), pγ(e))
can be expressed by:
pα(e) = Pr{q1 > q2|e} =
P
i>j
πij(e), pβ(e) = Pr{q1 < q2|e} =
P
i<j
πij(e), pγ(e) =
Pr{q1 = q2|e} = P
i=j
πij(e).
Assume that diﬀerent eﬀort pairs are distinguishable statistically, that is, the
following condition holds:
Condition (C.2): ∀el 6= ek, P (el) 6= P (ek).
Condition (C.2) thus ensures that the optimal collusion-proof mechanism we
employed under the environment of verifiable outputs can also be applied un-
der unverifiable outputs. Therefore, nonverifiability has no bites to the optimal
collusion-proof implementation, as concluded immediately:
Proposition 4. Assume Condition (C.2) hold. Assume also that actions are
mutually observable and outputs are not verifiable, then the eﬀort pair e∗ can be
enforced and first-best incentive contract can be implemented through an optimal
collusion-proof mechanism which has a unique SPNE.
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as in the previous section and thus omitted.
Remark 2. Notice that, condition (C.2) implies condition (C.1) and is thus
stronger than the later. Nevertheless, it is not restrictive and can be satisfied
generically.
The assumption of |Ω| = 3 is necessary to meet condition (C.2). Suppose not,
there are only two verifiable states, namely, "win" or "loss". Let {w, l } denote
the states "agent A1 wins" and "agent A1 loses" respectively. Assuming a fair
tie-broken rule, then the probability distribution can be expressed by:
pw(e) = Pr{q1 > q2|e}+ 12 Pr{q1 = q2|e} =
P
i>j
πij(e) + 12
P
i=j
πij(e);
pl(e) = Pr{q1 < q2|e}+ 12 Pr{q1 = q2|e} =
P
i<j
πij(e) + 12
P
i=j
πij(e).
The basic assumption of identical production technologies suggests that, for any
symmetric eﬀort pairs with e1 = e2, the induced matrix of probability distribution
is also symmetric, that is, πij(e) = πji(e), which implies pw(e) = pl(e) = 12 . In
other words, when agents’ production technologies are identical, exerting the same
eﬀort levels results in the same probabilities of win or loss, which equals to 12 in
two agents cases. In this case, condition (C.2) is violated and the problem of
non-identifiablility of symmetric eﬀort pairs arises. As a result, the mechanism we
developed is not suﬃcient to implement the first-best under nonverifiable outputs
in the presence of collusion.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper brings a new point of view into the theory of collusion-proof mech-
anism design, which highlights the principle of divide and conquer in fighting col-
lusion. Two restrictions in the framework of Laﬀont-Martimort-Itoh are relaxed,
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which allows us to incorporate the approach of private enforcement into the theory.
In a setting of moral hazard with mutually observable actions, a multi-stage indirect
mechanism integrated with secret reporting and private transferring is developed to
show that the first-best allocation can be implemented in spite of collusion, which
implies that preventing collusion entails no cost under new approaches.
This paper also appeals to rethink the methodology of the theory of collusion-
proof mechanism design, in order to find out more powerful mechanisms and ap-
proaches for preventing collusion. As pointed out by Tirole (1986), in general, we
should investigate what kind of allocation can be implemented by the principal
when all types of bilateral coalitions are allowed, including coalitions between the
principal and agents. When a bilateral coalition between the principal and agent
can be enforced by a contract in a private way, collusion between agents then turns
to be a game with incomplete information which brings transaction costs to the
coalition. This highlights the principle of divide and conquer. However, there are
diﬃculties in characterizing the contract equilibria when sequentially forming of
coalitions is allowed, since in each round, a coalition formation can impose nega-
tive externalities on other players, which in turn induces another round of coalition
formation. Hence, in this endeavor, a generalized theory on multi-contracting with
externalities should be developed on which the new theory of collusion-proof mech-
anism design can be built, and this deserves further devotions by the theorists in
the future.
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